GWD-8-Q7 to GWD-8-Q10:
The system of patentgranting,
which confers
temporary monopolies for
Line the exploitation of new tech-
(5) nologies, was originally
established as an incentive
to the pursuit of risky new
ideas. Yet studies of the
most patent-conscious
(10) business of all—the semiconductor
industry—suggest
that firms do not necessarily
become more innovative as
they increase their patenting
(15) activity(比較型題目,說明公司專利多,不見得有創意,特別是半導體產業).
Ziedonis and Hall,
for example(看懂上面的定義,舉例就略讀), found that
investment in research and
development (a reasonable
proxy for innovation) did
(20) not substantially increase
between 1982 and 1992,
the industry’s most feverish
period of patenting. Instead,(重點在後)
semiconductor firms simply
(25) squeezed more patents out
of existing research and
development expenditures.
Moreover, Ziedonis and
Hall found that as patenting
(30) activity at semiconductor
firms increased in the
1980’s, the consensus
among industry employees
was that the average quality
(35) of their firms’ patents
declined.(印證上述兩人觀察到的squeeze out) Though patent
quality is a difficult notion
to measure, the number of
times a patent is cited in
(40) the technical literature is
a reasonable yardstick, and
citations per semiconductor
patent did decline during
the 1980’s.(繼續印證) This decline in
(45) quality may be related to
changes in the way semiconductor
firms managed
their patenting process:
rather than patenting to win
(50) exclusive rights to a valuable
new technology, (rather than出現,重點在第二句)patents
were filed more for strategic
purposes, to be used as
bargaining chips(我認為這應該解釋為什麼甜頭的) to ward
(55) off infringement suites(擋住別人的侵略) or
as a means to block
competitors’ products.